

23th of December

**One and a Half Centuries in the History of Russia and Japan:
The Epoch of Great Transformations**

Wada Haruki (Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo)

Modern Russia and Japan—Crossing and Benefiting Historical Paths of Neighbors

Russia and Japan, two neighboring countries had trodden similar paths of social development in the modern times. Modernization from above and aspiration to become big power were common state aim of both countries. But what I would like to emphasize is the fact that their paths frequently crossed and influenced each other, some times benefitted from neighbor much.

Peter Great's Model and the Meiji Revolution

The Assasination of Tsar Alexander II and the Meiji 14 Coup d'etat (1881)

The Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolutions 1905-1917

Two Soviet-Japanese Wars and Destinies of two countries

Russia and Japan, two neighbouring countries had trodden similar paths of social development in the modern times. Modernization from above and aspiration to become big power were common state aim of both countries. But their paths frequently crossed and influenced each other. Some times these crossing provided great benefit to each neighbor and some times serious damages too. But we can say that damage also guided each country in choosing its future. They proved to be useful to both of them.

Now it is time to close the old pages of our history and to open a new page of sincere cooperation of two neighbors. Neither wars, nor tensions will affect our relations any more. We must become true partners to seek for a way of peaceful cooperation and mutual help.

Mescheryakov Alexander (RSUH).

Meiji reforms from Russian Perspective: the Reinterpretation of Sea

Many different reforms were undertaken in Meiji Japan. There were not only political or institutional. Reforms of mind were also in progress. During Meiji era the Japanese changed their attitude toward sea greatly. In Tokugawa period they praised sea as a natural phenomena which preserve Japan from aggression and evil influences from abroad and during Meiji era began think of sea as substance which connect Japan with the whole world.

Kimura Takashi (Professor Emeritus of Kyoto University)

Premodern Concepts “*Kokutai*” as the Inseparable inherent Elements of Modernization in the Historical Process of Japan

Among different driving forces behind Japanese modernization in XIX century, specialists usually distinguish one - Japanese ruling circles' fears of the threats emanating from Western colonial powers, including the USA. However we can't forget that, by that time internal capacities of the country for rapid changes in technological, administrative, military, educational, and economic spheres had already reached required level.

“*Kokutai*” ideas had emerged and had been studied at the Mito school even before the Meiji Restoration (Meiji Ishin). These ideas, almost for a hundred years, up to surrender of Great

Japanese Empire in the Second World War, had undergone numerous changes. But I would like to note that precise notion of these ideas has never been distinctly formulated. From an objective point of view, it seems that there are no even small elements of modernism in “*kokutai*” ideas. Moreover, it appears that different types of “*kokutai*” ideas undoubtedly represent premodernism in its purest form.

The paper will present an analysis of interdependent and complementary relations between “premodernism” and “modernism”. The above mentioned internal capacities also include “*kokutai*” ideas, which were intended to become principal reasons for creating the country’s new image, based on Japanese traditions. In 1868 Meiji government promulgated “Go-kajo no Goseimon” (the five articles State program) in the form of imperial vow. There still couldn’t be seen a strong impact of “*kokutai*” ideas. But in “Kyoiku chokugo” (the Imperial rescript on education) released in 1890, “*kokutai*” ideas were clearly expressed in the form of the state’s ethical requirements for Japanese people.

One year before, “Dai-Nippon Teikoku Kenpo” (the Constitution of the Empire of Japan) was published. Some of the articles were heavily influenced by “*kokutai*” ideas, yet the Constitution also included “rational” articles which collided with the principles of “*kokutai*”.

This paper also analyzes other cases of “*kokutai*”, like “Ni-ni-roku jiken”(attempted coup d’état in Japan on 26 February 1936), or acceptance of Potsdam Declaration; and the first article of the post-war Constitution that declared the emperor as “the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people”. To compare with Russian history, the author will touch upon similarity between “*kokutai*” ideas and “S.S. Uvarov’s triad”.

The conclusion of the report is that “premodernism” of “*kokutai*” ideas is nothing more than attempts to find modernism in its original form.

Aoshima Yoko (Kobe University)

A Comparative Study of Russia’s “Great Reforms” and Japan’s Meiji “Restoration”

Russia’s “Great Reforms” and Japan’s Meiji “Restoration” mark one of the biggest watersheds in the modern histories of both countries. Both movements were attempts to transform the shape of the country to adapt to and counter the current expanding global order, of which Western countries had taken the rein. In the case of Russia, the defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, and in the case of Japan, the arrival of the American Black Ships in 1853, were the events that forced the decision for change in each respective country.

The two reforms resemble each other in that both of them tried to retain the national polity of having the emperor at the center while adopting Western technology and institutions. However, Russia’s Great Reforms were an effort to update the gradual process of westernization and modernization that had been in place since Peter the Great, while, in the case of Japan, a sequence of reactions to external pressures lead to a fundamental regime change over just a short period. In other words, the pace and degree of change in Japan was more drastic than that in Russia.

This presentation will focus on the changes in social structure, especially the relationships between the emperor, the elite and the masses. The main period for analysis will be from the start of reforms to the establishment of the constitution and parliament in each country. Special attention will be paid to the centralization of ruling the land and the people, which had been previously placed under the indirect rule of the elite. In Russia, the biggest event was the Emancipation (1861), while in Japan, it was Hanseki-Hokan (1869: the return of the land and the people from the feudal lords to the Emperor) and HaiHan-ChiKen (the abolition of feudal domains (Han) and the establishment of the prefectural system (Ken)).

In Japan, the radical modernizing reforms provoked a series of rebellions by unsatisfied former warriors, which lead to the civil war in 1877. In comparison, the Fronde in Russia was not caused by the Emancipation. In Japan, the legitimacy of the regime change was supported by the “parliamentary regime theory” (Kogi-seitai-ron) from the beginning, and so there was no serious conflict due to the introduction of the parliamentary system. In Russia, on the other hand, the public

sphere was opened within the administrative system, the case of Zemstvo being an example, and so the establishment of the parliament was delayed.

In terms of the role of the masses, in Japan, privatization of the land was realized in 1873, and the village headmen (Kocho), to which former leaders of the village in the Edo era were usually elected, played a crucial role both in implementing the reforms pursued by the government and in developing the Movement for Liberty and People's Rights. In Russia, however, the communal form of land use was preserved, and the village headmen were forced to select from above during the Emancipation, meaning they were not prepared for the new intermediate role between the local village and the government.

Throughout the analysis, this presentation will demonstrate how both countries, which undertook analogous reforms under similar external pressures, traced different paths towards modernization.

Tolstoguzov Sergei (Hiroshima University)
Meiji Restoration and Russian 1917 Revolution.
Towards the comparative study of the events.

It is good time now to talk about a theoretical evaluation of the two great historical events from a comparative perspective, that is, the essential transformative process in the two countries, Japan and Russia, that resulted in the transformation of different social systems into the modern state. Concerning this transformation it is quite clear that:

First, many researchers will share the opinion that the elite of Russia and Japan realized the vital necessity of the importation of social and other institutions from leader-states of Europe, and made the choice in this direction. Not only did they reorient the ideological motivations of their respective societies, but, also, they achieved great level of success in their aims.

Second, the process of adaptation actually was not short, but took place over a span of time which included various stages, different in the Russia and Japan.

The Meiji Restoration and The Russian 1917 Revolution had occurred in different contexts and stages in the process of transformation. The social systems in these countries also had many fundamental differences. Thus, the research into these particular stages and differences of social systems in both countries needs further investigation.

Sarkisov Konstantin (Professor Emeritus, Yamanashi Gakuin University)
Japan and Omsk Government .
A part of Japan's intervention in Siberia. (Sept. 1918 - Dec. 1919)

Japan's intervention in Siberia (1918-1922) revealed a substantial gap between Japan Imperial diplomacy and military. A "military party" in Japan was already gaining political strength but its influence became overwhelming a decade later. Military didn't have an upper hand over diplomacy, and it was true during all four years of invasion but in the case of the Omsk government's (Kolchak) period it appeared most apparently.

The emergence of Provisional All-Russian Government in Ufa in September 1918 under left and right-wing SRs launched the process of uniting all anti-Bolshevik forces. It became very promising on September 18th when admiral Kolchak came to power. Inside and outside Russia it was perceived as a real chance to unite anti-Bolshevik forces scattered all over the country.

The emergence of this regime called as the Omsk Government after its move to this West Siberian city appeared to be a challenge to Japanese military who staked on cossack's leaders like

Semenov, Kalmykov, Gamov in Trans-Baikal region. The archive documents present many evidences of considerable differences between diplomats and military. High Commissioner of Japan in Vladivostok Matsudaira Tsuneo in late September 1918 dispatch was asking foreign minister Goto Shimpei to resist the General Staff ' s intention to support Cossack ataman's idea of an Autonomous Government eastward from Baikal lake. ⁱ

The Japanese army had to follow the political line of its government. When Semenov declared his antagonistic position to Kolchak Otani Kikuzo - Commander- in-chief of Japanese forces in Siberia sent a personal letter to Semenov asking him "as a friend" to be calm and composed though he understood his feelings".ⁱⁱ

Kolchak's stance toward Japan transformed from admiral's suspicions and blunt rejection of Japanese direct involvement except providing money and weapons to the situation (from April 1919) when Japan became the only country at the Paris Peace Conference on several occasions insisting on official recognition of Omsk Government.ⁱⁱⁱ In May 1919 Kolchak's sent to Tokyo his personal messenger General-Lieutenant Ivan Romanovsky, a prominent figure of the White Movement. Russian general spent more than 40 days in Tokyo (Kamakura) and left it on June 30 driven by bad news from the Kolchak's army frontlines.

Earlier on June 12th Omsk government officially asked Tokyo to send Japanese troops to replace Czechoslovaks leaving the railroad area westward Baikal lake. Tokyo didn't agree and turned down the request. Japanese General Staff was not agreeable seeing that as technically not viable. On August 14th Japanese Government secretly made a decision to receive and embrace Omsk Government if it have to leave Omsk and move eastward Baikal. Two days before Japanese government appointed Japanese ambassador to Omsk Government. Kato Tsunetada was full of energy and ambition to save Kolchak's regime. On November 6, only days before the fall of Omsk Uchida Ryohei, new foreign minister, telegraphed to Kato in Omsk: Japanese government decided to provide Omsk with rifles and various ammunition of 29 million yen worth, the Yokohama Specie Bank and Choson Bank's credit of 50 million yen.^{iv}

The principle "not to move westward Baikal" remained intact and Japan didn't prevent Kolchak's defeat and ultimate collapse. Japan's consul in Omsk Nihei Heiji leaving the capital of Kolchak took the liberty to write his superior that rejection to go westward Baikal left the Omsk government alone to fend off the fatal threat. ^v He appealed to save it, but all efforts were too late.

Shulatov Yaroslav (Hiroshima City University)

Japan during the first quarter of 20th century: on the path to a “great power”

Grishachev Sergey (RSUH)

Conservative turn and counter-reforms in Japan during the 1930-s

Studying 1930-40th of Japanese history is connected with number of certain difficulties. World War II ended up with tragedy for Japan. But conservative turn in domestic policy in early 1930th and joining the war in the beginning of 1940th took place due to different circumstances. So the reasons why Japanese government had to take the number of tough decisions in the 1st half of 1930ies will be looked through here in this report. Besides this, it is very important to analyze the estimations of this period given by Soviet and modern Russian historians in their works.

Panov Alexander (MGIMO-University)

Democratic transformations in post-war Japan

Shimotomai Nobuo, Kobayashi Akina (Hosei University)
The “Thaw” and reforming attempts in the USSR during the Cold War.

This presentation aims to provide an overview of the reforming attempts in the USSR during the Cold War.

First, we analyze the beginning of the Cold War after the WWII, second, the Soviet reactions against the high tense relations between West-East countries from 1955 to 1985, third, the Soviet attempts during the period of Mikhail Gorbachev.

Although the Soviet Union had a powerful impact on the East European countries and China during the Stalin period after the Second World War, the Soviet diplomatic and military policies aroused the Western Allies suspicions. After the death of Stalin, since Nikita Khrushchev had denounced the Stalin, the Soviet authority started and tried to change the high tense situations between the Western countries. However, the Cuban missile crisis turned these positive situations into negative ones. After this confrontation in 1962, the Soviet military spending and budget were getting higher and higher, and the cost of military spending increased the domestic financial pressure. This is the main reason of why Gorbachev decided large-scale reform, the so-called Perestroika in the USSR.

Murashkin Nikolai (University of Cambridge)
Great Transformations in Russia and Japan after the Cold War: Liberal or Conservative?

This paper looks into the role of policy-making carried out by various government officials in the Japanese financial community who contributed to the formulation and implementation of Japanese “Silk Road Diplomacy” in the 1990s and 2000s. Furthermore, it examines the role of key Japanese political constituencies and factions – conservative, (neo)-liberal and others – in the overall Japanese geopolitical engagement in post-Cold War Central Asia.

When the five Central Asian republics of the USSR became independent in 1991, they soon encountered a proactive engagement of Japanese diplomacy toward them. Besides boosting bilateral assistance and economic ties, official Tokyo has vigorously promoted the Central Asian states’ eligibility in many international financial institutions and provided extensive advice on reform policies. A number of Japanese and Central Asian officials shared a preference for gradualism in economic reforms as a popular approach alternative to the Western neoliberalism in Central Asian countries, although the extent of embracing gradualism varied upon individual republics and advising officials. Spurred by the failures of the Washington consensus and financial crises of the 1990s, Central Asian gradualism could be regarded as an early precursor kind of post-neoliberalism – supported and sponsored by Japan – but cannot be reduced to it, given the instrumentalisation of gradualism in the domestic politics and political economy of Central Asia, as well as geopolitical and pragmatic drivers in Japanese foreign policy.

Streltsov Dmitry (MGIMO-University)¹
Social, political and economic transformation in today’s Japan: the Heisei revolution

Political modernization, which is accompanied by emergence of new political institutions, is

¹ Настоящий доклад подготовлен при финансовой поддержке РФНФ, проект 16-01-50085 «"Система 1955 года": политическая власть в Японии в эпоху холодной войны».

a complex and lengthy process, the contents of which are qualitative changes in the political systems associated with the transformation of all aspects of society.

Conditions for a new phase of political modernization matured with Japan's transition to the post-industrial development mode. Up to that point, the Japanese political elite had failed to resolve several fundamental issues related to improving the effectiveness of political control. This refers, above all, to the need to create a competitive architecture of political parties. Another important point of political modernization is to elaborate a better system of political decision-making for the party in power.

Political modernization should be analyzed in the context of the problem of the evolution of the basic role of political parties in Japan's political system. The most widely spread notion of a political party in the political science is that it emerged as a form of protest against privileges and power. Compared to this, political parties in Japan never performed a function of protest. Since the moment of formation of the modern party system political parties in Japan were organized from within the existing power system and as an instrument of power against opposition. Along the twentieth century the most widely spread point of view in Japan was that parties that are not (or have not been) in power are not political parties at all. In reality decision-making in postwar Japan was characterized by an axiom that political influence might be performed only by the ruling camp.

Another vital feature of the Japanese political parties is their excessive political expedience resulting in ideological amorphousness and even unprincipledness. In the eyes of many people political parties look like mutual assistance societies with the main function of not serving the electors' needs, but paving the way to power for their members. Public disappointment in political parties was aggravated by the excessive pragmatism of their leaders, their disregard for moral standards in the power struggle, their readiness to sacrifice principles even for the sake of short-term objectives.

In the period of the 1955 system LDP positioned itself as a "supermarket party" where electors from every social strata could find desirable "items". It can be accepted that under the cold war paradigm LDP acted basing on the interests of the whole nation, while its main competitor the Socialist Party whose support base was formed by large enterprise-based trade unions reflected the interests of mostly the hired workforce of export industries.

Initiators of the political reform of 1993-94 wished to strengthen the role of political parties in the system of public administration. They aimed the formation of a two-party system tailored by the US or British model, meaning that the two largest parties should periodically change each other in power. Yet, the reform did not lead to a full-fledged competition between different party concepts of strategic choices. Since the political reform of 1993-94 practically all parties failed to draw border lines between different political approaches to many urgent problems. Even after the historical change of power in 2009 the LDP and the DPJ pretending to form a two-party system failed to construct a watershed over the major issues of public policy that would enable to distinguish them as a 'conservative' and a 'liberal' party. One of the paradoxes of this situation is that the 'conservatives' often acted as champions of liberal and even socialist policies. The Liberal Democratic Party, which remained in power for more than a half of a century, paved the way for Japan's postwar economic breakthrough due to its pragmatic, flexible ruling.

One of the factors contributing to changes in the party politics in Japan is the qualitative shift in the social portrait of the Japanese electorate. The outcome of the elections is to a larger degree determined by the politically motivated strata of voters. It is noteworthy that the elections in small constituencies in 2000-s have repeatedly demonstrated the strengthening of the factor of floating votes. They demonstrate a lively interest in the content of the political manifestos of parties whose brands have significantly increased their significance in the eyes of 'political voters'. In contrast to the traditional voters, whose political choice is to a larger extent determined by the origin, social status, and attitude to traditional institutions etc., floating votes, as a product of the post-industrial civilization, appear to be more volatile in their political preferences.

The elections confirmed the growing importance of populism – in the meaning that political choices are done by the impact of the image of a popular political leader. In this respect, a special importance is given to moral reputation of politicians and their personal non-susceptibility not only

to an obvious corruption, but also to minor violations of the current legislation, for example, non-compliance with the rules in the areas of taxation, pensions, political donations and so on.

In this respect, the personality of Shinzo Abe attracts attention. Abe set himself apart from Japan's tradition of revolving-door prime ministers who last a year or so in office. He led his Liberal Democratic Party back to power in 2012 after voters lost confidence in the upstart Democratic Party of Japan, which ruled for three unsteady years, leaving the opposition divided and in disarray.

Electoral practice attracts a special attention to issues of electoral reform which has become one of the main items on the political agenda of contemporary Japan. The majority principle determines drastic changes of power at each subsequent election. So, in the general elections to 2005, 2009, 2012 and 2014, the winning party acquired a landslide victory, obtaining in each case around 300 seats, which is close to the constitutional majority.

Another noteworthy moment is the negative impact of electoral rules on the coherence of party platforms. Given that even small fluctuations in electoral consciousness prove to be decisive for the outcome of the public vote, parties prefer not to put forward clear-cut and well-articulated policy manifestos which can "scare off" even a limited number of dissenting voters. Moreover, some parties fear that the proclamation of a distinct political line that can anyway harm the interests of certain support groups which in turn would reduce them financial aid from influential organizations.

The elections have confirmed that under the current rules a real opportunity for political survival is in the hands of fairly major political parties. Thus, the political arena is dominated by the polarization effect which is aggravated by the lack of the political niche for small parties. Historically, in Japan the demand for the political protection of the rights of racial, ethnic, religious, gender and other minorities was limited, so the political institutionalization of their interest did not occur. Moreover, the Japanese society with its strong middle class is relatively homogenous in economic terms, and the contradiction between capital and labour is not irreconcilable. Another factor contributing to the polarization effect is the consciousness of Japanese voters. They are motivated by the protectionist policy and are inclined to support primarily the parties who have a real prospect of coming to power. Against the background of the polarization phenomenon, small parties will either be forced to form a block with larger actors, or to simply fade away from the political scene.

Institutional aspects of the electoral reform of the Heisei era Japan attract attention in the context of the issue of disparity of votes which comprised a big problem for Japan in the whole post-war period. Such a disparity arouses doubts over the validity of the basic democratic principle, e.g. each voter shall have one vote, and all votes shall be equal.

Another problem is the issue of political leadership in the sphere of decision-making. In a broad sense, the solution of this problem involves a revision of the basic principles of relations between the administrative and political authorities, as well as the methods of interaction between politicians and bureaucrats. According to a traditional view, those are the bureaucrats, not the politicians, who play the central part in the decision-making process in Japan. In fact, bureaucrats are involved in the coordination of decision-making even at the highest political level. The bureaucrats are also assigned the role of intermediaries in the process of harmonizing political interests of parliamentary factions and individual units within the party administration.

Iwashita Akihiro (Kyushu University & Hokkaido University)
Japan's Borders: Challenges and Prospects

These days, it is widely-recognized that territory is a constructed product of nationalism. It is

certainly true that territorial issues in East Asia are artificially framed within nation-centered discourses and imaginations, while being politically fanned by the media and education policies. Recent clashes over the disputed islands surrounding Japan are good examples of the relevance of notions such as the 'territorial trap' and other related concepts within political geography.

During the Cold War era, Japan, secured by the sea, had been considered largely safe because the borderland conflict that characterized this period had been concentrated on the Eurasian continent, such as the Soviet-Sino river disputes and the North-South confrontation in Korea. As people and states became exhausted of these narrowed spatial disputes over the inland borderlands of Eurasia, the major conflicts gradually became frozen (even if it not completely resolved, as was the case with the Sino-Russian river disputes).

In contrast, since the 1970s the maritime order has been reshuffled and gradually characterized by competition: the scope of territorial waters was universally extended out from the shoreline from three to twelve miles, and exclusive economic zones were recognized as incorporating a further 200 miles of maritime territory. Competition for more extensive maritime spaces became intense and the overlapping sea zones between the concerned parties came to require regulation through mutual negotiation and arrangements. Specifically, Japan faced challenges because it shares sea zones with Russia, Korea, China and Taiwan. As a result, a new framework regulating fishing waters with Russia and temporary zones for exploiting fishing resource with Korea and China were established in the 1990s.

Japan's territorial issues took on a new meaning in this context. Japan has numerous islets that dot the ocean, and can only be maintained at huge cost. However, these islets have turned into gifts, by which Japan can claim vast territorial waters and their accompanying resources and exclude other countries from access to them. In fact, Japan is now proud of its status as the sixth largest EEZ holder in the world, though ranking a mere 61st in terms of territorial size.

The paper features Japan's borders challenges, particularly focusing on the territorial disputes (Northern Territories, Takeshima and Senkakus) and their surrounding seas, and the possibilities for future cooperation with its neighbors.

Belov Andrey (Fukui Prefectural University) Path dependence in Japan-Russia trade: Evidence from over a century of bilateral relations

Regular trade and economic relations between Japan and Russia were established in the second half of the 19th century. However, such trade has begun to play a significant economic role only in the past 100 to 120 years. This long interval can be divided as follows: the initial (1858-1945), the post-war (1946-1991) and the contemporary (1992 to the present day) periods.

It is easy to imagine the diversity of the social and political environment for development of economics and trade relations. However, despite the obvious historical differences, during each of these periods, trade and other economic relations had at least three common characteristics. First, political dynamics strongly influenced economic relations, either in a positive or negative way. Second, individual shares of bilateral trade were extremely low, and typically, ranked by share in total bilateral trade for Japan, Russia was somewhere in the lower end among the second twenty of partners. Finally, Japan mostly supplied manufactured goods in exchange for Russian raw materials, in spite of constant changes in actual commodity structure.

It seems possible that the Japan-Russia relations depended heavily on previous historical events, which formed a stable path of development and restricted the options for more effective cooperation. In this regard, we can assert the existence of path dependence and recommend measures to improve the situation using the arsenal of institutional theory. At the same time, the initial years of the 2010s have brought significant changes to the traditional model of trade. Market forces have started to replace politics as the primary driver, the amount of trade has surpassed previous records, and Japan's investment in the Russian energy sector and participation in automotive manufacturing has delivered the financial capital and technological expertise for high value-added production in Russia. It means that recent history does provide positive examples of the

transition to a more efficient path. That is why the path-changing efforts in Japan-Russia economic relations could be useful in addressing not only bilateral concerns, but also a broad range of pressing domestic and international issues.

Chugrov Sergey (MGIMO-University)
Mutual perception of Japan and Russia: How we look at each other

The recent efforts of Russia and Japan to unblock the territorial impasse were complicated by some hurdles of socio-psychological character, including mutual suspicions and conflicting mutual images. Public opinion surveys disclose major vectors in Russo-Japanese relations, which seem to correlate with the transformation of mutual images. Actually, these patterns amazingly display interrelated ‘mirror’ dynamics connected with the independent variable – events happening in bilateral relations. How does the public consciousness produce impact on real politics and mutual perception of our countries suffering from lack of trust.

To examine the strength of like/dislike sentiment we make use of two long-term sociological studies: a series of surveys conducted by Russia’s leading public opinion agencies and annual opinion polls on foreign policy issues conducted by the Information Bureau of the Japanese Cabinet Office.

Russian perception of Japan and Japanese, operating with the ‘friend’ and ‘foe’ notions, displays a relatively low level of positive feelings about relations with Japan, such as ‘solid and friendly’, but the level of negative sentiment, such as ‘tense, hostile’, is similarly low. In Japan, in spite of the obvious positive shifts, the level of liking for Russia remains inadmissibly low. One can even say that prejudices about Russia have intertwined with some kinds of phobias and phantoms stemming from twists and turns of history.

Moscow and Tokyo clearly do not have serious unsolved problems in their bilateral relations, with the exception of the well-known territorial problem. However, why is the public so suspicious about each other? Can the territorial row be the only cause? It seems to be not the case. The investigated public opinion trends give grounds to believe that it is very problematic for Japan and Russia to find a mutually acceptable solution, as their relations are not free from mutual mistrust deeply rooted in the history of their relations. It will be far easier to overcome the mistrust and, therefore, to find a ‘win-win solution’ of the territorial issue when they are successful in scrutinizing the historical grudges, when they comprehend their nature and origin.

ⁱ *Documents of foreign policy of Japan*, 1918. Vol. 1. Case 14 " Relations with extremists". MOFA of Japan, T., 1968. P. 593, 594

ⁱⁱ *Ibid.* P. 624, 625

ⁱⁱⁱ *FRUS, 1919*, Foreign Relations, Russia, Chapter II Siberia. C. 198, 272, 345, 346, 354-356, 362, 378, 379

^{iv} *Documents of foreign policy of Japan*, 1919. Vol. 1. Case 17 " Military Expedition in Siberia". MOFA of Japan, T., 1970. P. 672

^v *Documents of foreign policy of Japan*, 1919. Vol. 1. Case 16 " Recognition of Omsk Government". MOFA of Japan, T., 1970. P. 597-599